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The Relationship of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons with other Agreements: Ambiguity, Complementarity, or Conflict?

The Relationship of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons with other Agreements: Ambiguity, Complementarity, or Conflict?

As discussed in Dan Joyner’s recent blog entry, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted by 122 States at a United Nations diplomatic conference in New York on 7 July 2017. Article 18 of the Treaty addresses its “relationship with other agreements”. There is, though, an ongoing debate as to the implications of this provision. On 7 July 2017, following the adoption of the Treaty by participating states in the United Nations diplomatic conference, Singapore (the sole abstention) stated in its explanation of vote that phrasing in the article was “ambiguous”. In this blog entry, I argue that this claim is unfounded.

Article 18 is based on a corresponding provision in Article 26(1) of the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the intent of which was to ensure that ATT states parties could adopt, or be party to, treaties and other binding agreements governing the trade in conventional arms and ammunition but that they could not lawfully implement any provisions under these other agreements if the obligations therein were inconsistent with their obligations in the ATT.

In the first draft of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (22 May 2017), it was stipulated in Article 19 that it “does not affect the rights and obligations of the States Parties under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”. Thus, it was apparent from the outset that the relationship between the future Treaty and the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) could be a bone of contention during the negotiations. This was borne out in practice in the June–July 2017 diplomatic conference.

With respect to relevant “obligations”, Article 1(b) and © of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, as adopted, is taken verbatim from Articles I and II of the NPT, respectively. In addition, although the precise formulations differ, there are clear prohibitions on assisting any of the prohibited activities in both the NPT and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

More problematic in the first draft treaty text were the “rights” to which draft Article 19 referred. This could, according to one interpretation, have allowed the five nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT — China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States — to adhere to the future Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons while retaining nuclear weapons, a scenario that would have defeated the purpose of the ban treaty, and was therefore unacceptable to the overwhelming majority of participating states in the June–July 2017 diplomatic conference.

Following plenary interventions by numerous states, the draft article was significantly amended to read in the final text of the Treaty as follows:

The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing international agreements, to which they are party, where those obligations are consistent with the Treaty.

The key words are “consistent with”. What these words mean in this provision is that obligations upon states parties to the Treaty from other agreements to which they are party and that are less restrictive cannot supersede those set out in the Treaty. In other words, a state party to another (less far-reaching) agreement on nuclear weapons cannot use its adherence to that agreement as an argument, much less a legal basis, to undercut the obligations it accepts by ratifying or acceding to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Of course, “consistent with” does not imply “identical to”. This is not what the wording is, and it’s not what it means.

In some ways, the provision in Article 18 is little more than a statement of common sense. A state party to 1996 Amended Protocol II to the CCW that was also party to the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention could not sustain in law the argument that because the Protocol allows the use of certain anti-personnel mines in certain instances, this somehow modified the comprehensive prohibition on use under the 1997 Convention. As we all know, Article 26 of the VCLT stipulates that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. And this principle – also known by the Latin maxim pacta sunt servanda – firmly underpins the existence and intent of Article 18 of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

This provision does not preclude a state party from adhering to any other treaty or binding agreement, such as a bilateral accord, that existed prior to it becoming party to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. But it may only respect and implement the obligations under another treaty or agreement to the extent that these obligations do not act as a form of reservation to its obligations under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (reservations being prohibited by Article 17). A state party to the Treaty could therefore ratify and respect the NPT, the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty, or the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). None of these requires action that would contravene the 2017 Treaty. However, Article 18 of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons confirms that any of the five nuclear-weapon states under the NPT could not lawfully retain their nuclear weapons if ever they adhere to the Treaty. This is consistent with Article 30 of the VCLT, which concerns the application of successive treaties relating to the same subject matter.

In sum, rather than lending itself to any ambiguity, the wording of Article 18 brings valuable clarity to the interpretation and application of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the conduct that is required of its states parties. It is a reflection of good practice, common sense, and applicable international law, including the good faith expected of States in the implementation of their treaty obligations. For many future states parties to this Treaty will, rightly and lawfully, be party also to other disarmament or non-proliferation agreements pertaining to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Treaty augments the existing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation treaty regime, it does not pull it apart or undermine it. But by adhering to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons states are going beyond the obligations they accepted in earlier global treaties and agreements. Those that adhere to this Treaty are renouncing nuclear weapons for good.

[via EJIL: Talk!]

https://www.dipublico.org/106842/the-relationship-of-the-2017-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons-with-other-agreements-ambiguity-complementarity-or-conflict/

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The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

On July 7, 2017 a vote was held by a United Nations treaty conference to adopt the final text of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Of the 124 states participating in the conference, 122 states voted for adoption, one state (the Netherlands) voted against adoption, and one state (Singapore) abstained. This vote brought to a successful close the second and final negotiating session for a United Nations nuclear weapons prohibition convention, the mandate for which had been given by the General Assembly in December 2016. The treaty will now be opened for signature by states on September 20, 2017, and will come into force 90 days after its 50^th ratification.

The TPNW provides for a complete ban on development, possession, and use of nuclear weapons by its parties. It is difficult to overstate the significance of the TPNW within the framework of treaties on nuclear nonproliferation. It is the first multilateral nuclear weapons disarmament treaty to be adopted since the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968. So we are witnessing a generational event of significance.

The essential obligations of the TPNW for any state that becomes a party thereto, are listed in Article 1, which provides as follows:

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:

(a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly;

© Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;

(d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;

(f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;

(g) Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

The TPNW is the ultimate product of two main trends in international relations that, to the surprise of many observers, came together successfully within just the past few years. The first trend is the longstanding frustration of most of the states parties to the NPT with the noncompliance of nuclear-weapon-possessing states with the NPT’s disarmament provisions, located in Article VI.

The second, and more recent trend, is what has been dubbed the humanitarian initiative; an effort that took shape in 2012, and that brought together more than 150 states and myriad civil society groups to focus on the unacceptable harm to human life, health, and environment that would be caused by any use of nuclear weapons.

These two trends coalesced in August, 2016 at a special United Nations working group on nuclear disarmament, held in Geneva. This working group recommended the negotiation of a treaty comprehensively banning nuclear weapons. That Autumn, the First Committee of the General Assembly adopted a resolution approving the mandate for such a conference, leading to the December 16, 2016 General Assembly resolution.

Noticeably absent throughout the negotiations on the TPNW – including in General Assembly debates, the formal treaty negotiation sessions, and the voting on the final treaty text – have been all nine states known to possess nuclear weapons (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea). These states, and a number of others, boycotted the negotiating process entirely. As Niki Haley, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, explained: “In this day and time we can’t honestly say that we can protect our people by allowing the bad actors to have [nuclear weapons] and those of us that are good, trying to keep peace and safety, not to have them.” Similarly, the British Ambassador to the United Nations, Matthew Rycroft has stated: “The UK is not attending the negotiations on a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons because we do not believe that those negotiations will lead to effective progress on global nuclear disarmament.”

Notwithstanding the non-participation of the nuclear-weapons-possessing states, the states negotiating the TPNW have expressed the view that the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons is an existential threat to humanity, and one that cannot be ignored simply because the few states that possess nuclear weapons are not yet ready to take meaningful steps to disarm themselves. They also see the TPNW as an important normative statement, by a supermajority of the states in the world, that the development, possession and use of nuclear weapons is immoral and must be prohibited, just as other weapons of mass destruction including chemical and biological weapons have been the subject of comprehensive prohibition treaties. And some states have expressed hope that this normative statement might contribute to the development of parallel customary international law.

Critics of the treaty, however, contend that without the participation and buy-in of the nuclear weapons states, the TPNW is little more than an idealistic statement of disapproval by states that do not themselves possess nuclear weapons. They argue that the TPNW will not be effective in convincing states that possess nuclear weapons to disarm, and that it may in fact do harm to the existing legal framework governing nuclear weapons proliferation, by undermining the centrality of the NPT as the nearly-universally-subscribed-to cornerstone of the regime.

The hope of states supporting the TPNW is that the treaty will constitute a normative nucleus around which efforts may be made by both states parties and international civil society to persuade nuclear-weapons-possessing states to join the treaty. The issue of verification of a former nuclear armed state’s implementation of the treaty’s disarmament provisions, once it becomes a party to the treaty, was one of the issues subject to heavy negotiation. The resulting provisions of Article 4 of the TPNW allow for former nuclear-weapons-possessing states to join the treaty as parties either after they have fully disarmed, or while still in possession of nuclear weapons, subject to a “legally binding, time-bound” plan for their destruction by a deadline to be determined by a meeting of the states parties.

From a legal perspective, there are many issues of analysis and interpretation that will keep scholars – well, me anyway – busy writing about the TPNW for years to come. These include the tension that will exist between the obligations of the TPNW, and the nuclear weapons commitments of NATO members. This, by the way, explains the Netherlands’ rather uncharacteristic vote against a nuclear disarmament treaty. NATO defense policy includes a longstanding commitment to nuclear weapons sharing agreements. At present, five NATO countries have such agreements with the United States, pursuant to which U.S. nuclear weapons are stationed on the territory of the host state, and are to be used by the host state’s military in the event of an armed conflict. The Netherlands is one of those states, along with Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Turkey. It is estimated that a total of 180 U.S. B-61 thermonuclear weapons are currently stationed on the territory of these five NATO host countries, the largest number of which are stationed at Aviano air base in Italy, and Incirlik air base in Turkey

But recall that Article 1(g) of the TPNW provides that no state party shall “Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.” This paragraph was very intentionally added to the TPNW in order to close a controversial loophole in Article II of the NPT, that NATO has long argued allows for such nuclear sharing agreements. So what happens if any member of NATO joins the TPNW? Can this provision of the TPNW be reconciled with the nuclear weapons sharing commitments of NATO members? Most NATO countries, clearly including the Netherlands, appear to think that it cannot be.

Other issues that require careful interpretation and analysis include the relationship between the TPNW and the NPT on matters such as safeguards of nuclear materials and facilities, and the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This is a subject that was contentious during the drafting of the treaty, and one on which I have already provided some preliminary commentary over at my blog.

From a political perspective, even without the buy-in of the nuclear armed states – and indeed precisely because of it – the TPNW will undoubtedly have an impact on nuclear weapons diplomacy going forward, particularly in the context of diplomacy surrounding the NPT. The next NPT Review Conference is scheduled for 2020, and the Preparatory Committee meetings for that conference have already begun. It will be important to see how the states parties to the TPNW seek to bring the treaty’s existence and implications into those already highly fraught negotiations about the health and relevance of the NPT. Many states parties to the TPNW see the new treaty as an implementation of Article VI of the NPT on nuclear disarmament, and will seek to have it acknowledged as such in the Review Conference’s final document. This will be heavily opposed by the nuclear armed states and those under their “umbrella” of nuclear protection. But negotiations on a consensus Review Conference final document are always unpredictable, and if some acknowledgment of the TPNW can be worked into it, that will represent a major political and potentially legal coup for the TPNW parties.

While much remains to be addressed both legally and politically concerning the TPNW, my own view is that the adoption of the TPNW is an event to be welcomed. It is a very useful legal supplement to the increasingly marginalized NPT, and represents a welcome shakeup of stagnant NPT politics. It very forcefully puts the issue of disarmament front and center in international nuclear weapons diplomacy. The nuclear-weapons-possessing-states can of course avoid signing the treaty. But it is now much more difficult for them to avoid seriously addressing the expressed will of the international community that nuclear weapons should be understood to be just as immoral as any other banned weaponry, and that as such their development, possession, and use should be prohibited in international law.

[via EJIL: Talk!]

https://www.dipublico.org/106758/the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/

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The Venezuela Crisis at the Organization of American States: Between Withdrawal and Suspension

The Venezuela Crisis at the Organization of American States: Between Withdrawal and Suspension

by Alonso Illueca

[Alonso Illueca is a lawyer and adjunct Professor of law at Universidad Catolica Santa Maria La Antigua and Universidad del Istmo Panama.]

On May 31, 2017, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (MCMFA) of the Organization of American States (OAS) will take place to consider the situation in Venezuela. This meeting was convened by the Permanent Council’s (PC) through resolution 1079/17 and based on the OAS Charter, articles 61 and 62 (see here). For several months, Venezuela has been under political turmoil. This state of affairs threatens the country’s democratic order and institutions. Moreover, Venezuela’s ongoing bid for withdrawal from the OAS is detrimental to Inter-American multilateralism. An effective Venezuelan withdrawal would set a precedent for future cases and weaken the OAS position vis-à-vis other regional organizations (CELAC). The current situation and the upcoming MCMFA provides an opportunity to consider the tools that international law provides to the OAS and it’s member States for preserving the organization’s membership. This article offers a perspective on some of the available options to the OAS for maintaining its status as the foremost regional agency of the American Hemisphere.

Venezuela’s withdrawal from the OAS

As a response to the PC resolution 1079/17 and the upcoming MCMFA, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister announced that the country would present a “letter of resignation” (in Spanish only) to the OAS. This letter, dated 27 April 2017, claims that the OAS is acting as an instrument for United States’ interventionism and presents to the Secretary General of the OAS (OASSG) the official notification of Venezuela’s definitive withdrawal from the organization. It is important to note that Venezuela stressed its willingness to comply with the “denunciation” procedure established in the OAS Charter.

Article 143 of the OAS Charter establishes that a withdrawing party must provide a written notification of its intentions to the OASSG, and after two years of such notification the withdrawal becomes effective. Additionally, it states that after this period the State concerned “shall cease to belong to the Organization after it has fulfilled the obligations arising from the present Charter”. With the aforementioned letter, Venezuela has only complied with one of these requirements. All things considered, Venezuela would cease to be an OAS Member State on 27 April 2019, as long as it fulfills its obligations under the OAS Charter.

The Venezuelan crisis and the Inter-American Democratic Charter

From a practical perspective, the Venezuelan government has interrupted the country’s democratic order twice, at least, since the start of crisis. First, by failing to convene a revocation referendum as established in the Venezuelan Constitution (in Spanish only). Second, by suspending the powers of the National Assembly through the Government controlled Supreme Court (see PC Res. 1078/17). This “suspension of powers” was later revoked.

With regard to the interruption of the democratic order, it is necessary to consider the paramount importance given to democracy in the OAS’ structure. The preamble of the OAS Charter considers democracy as an indispensable condition for the stability, peace and development of the region. It also lists among its essential purposes “to promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of non-intervention.” Moreover, it mentions among its principles the effective exercise of representative democracy.

The OAS Charter provides for the suspension of member States whose democratically elected governments have been overthrown by force. In 2001, the Third Summit of the Americas expanded this provision by adopting the Declaration of Quebec City, containing the “democracy clause,” which establishes that “any unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the democratic order in a state of the Hemisphere constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to the participation of that state’s government in the Summits of the Americas process.” On September 11 of the same year, the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC) was adopted. Article 19 of the IADC further expands the democracy clause to all the organs and bodies of the OAS, including the General Assembly (GA), the MCMFA, specialized conferences, commissions, and working groups. Further, article 20 establishes that prior to suspending a member State, the PC may undertake diplomatic initiatives to restore democracy.

In its more than 15 years of history, the IADC has been invoked in situations involving Venezuela (2002), Nicaragua (2004, 2005), Ecuador (2005, 2010), Bolivia (2005, 2008), and Honduras (2009). Only once a State has been suspended through the IADC. In 2009, Honduras right to participate in the organization was suspended in a special meeting of GA, after OASSG’s diplomatic had initiatives failed (AG/Res. 2 (XXXVII-E/09)). It is important to note that, while suspended, Honduras continued to be a Member of the Organization, obliged to fulfill its obligations.

The OAS’ dilemma: What to do next? Is it too late?

In 2016, the OASSG invoked the IADC (art. 20) with regard to the situation in Venezuela (here). In a recent NY Times article, he called for free and fair elections in Venezuela as a mechanism for avoiding their suspension from the OAS by way of the IADC. The OASSG concluded that suspension is the last resource in the regulatory framework of the IADC. In the same vein, the PC, when enacting resolution 1078/17, decided only to undertake diplomatic initiatives under the IADC, by inter alia considering convening the MCMFA. As mentioned above, the upcoming MCMFA was called upon by the PC (resolution 1079/17) and seems to be part of the diplomatic initiatives considered by resolution 1078/17 undertaken prior to adopting the last resort measure (suspension).

In this sense, it seems that the OAS’ diplomatic initiatives and even the “suspension” option came a little too late, as Venezuela has already initiated its withdrawal process from the organization. Had the GA convened in special session and suspended Venezuela’s participation in the OAS, prior to the issuance of Venezuela’s withdrawal letter of 27 April 2017, any subsequent denunciation attempt would had been ineffective.

Nevertheless, the withdrawal clause of the OAS Charter may prove useful in constraining Venezuela from exiting the organization. When a State decides to withdraw from a treaty, it needs to comply with the procedure agreed upon or obtain the consent of all the States parties (see, 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) art. 54). In the case at hand, the OAS Charter requires the State concerned to notify its intentions to the SG, wait a mandatory period of 2 years, and fulfill its obligations arising from the Charter. The latter requirement could be interpreted narrowly to include financial obligations only (Venezuela has approximately an 8 million dollar debt with the OAS), which is the generally held view, or be expanded to include the principles and purposes included in Charter dealing with democracy.

The second option could potentially add some extra burden to Venezuela’s right to withdraw. If this option is analyzed in conjunction with the paramount importance given to the IADC in each of the documents issued by the PC or the OASSG, it could be argued that among the obligations for Venezuela arising from the Charter are the ones supporting representative democracy. Nonetheless, considering that this is the first time that a State withdraws from the OAS, there are no factual precedents on which to draw upon. Consequently, when considering this question, resort to the VCLT’ general rule and supplementary means of interpretation (art. 31-32) would be necessary. In any event, the OAS Secretary of Legal Affairs stressed that the main obligation of Venezuela would be to pay the debts it owes to the organization.  He also articulated that Venezuela would remain a full member of the organization with all its rights and obligations, at least, for the next two years.

Besides its many shortcomings, the IADC is yet to be considered a legally binding instrument (see Perina). It provides for collective action in cases of “unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime” through diplomatic initiatives and suspension. In the case of Venezuela, collective action is currently limited to diplomatic initiatives. However, it remains difficult to understand which would be the practical effect of suspension if Venezuela has already decided to withdraw from the organization. In this sense, would the suspension of the membership suspend the 2-year denunciation notice period? A case with some similarities, if any, is the one North Korea and its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In that case, the withdrawal was unilaterally suspended by North Korea for 10 years. For many reasons, North Korea’s status in the NPT remains contested until today. However, it differs from the case of Venezuela because the decision to suspend the withdrawal was taken by the withdrawing State, not implicitly ordered by the organization in question.

Conclusion

Some analysts suggest that the OAS’ ongoing role in the Venezuelan crisis has compromised its natural role as a prospective mediator. In shaping its own practice the OAS and its Member States must consider the principles and purposes of the organization and the applicable rules of international law. Nevertheless, the OAS and its legal experts may have a unique opportunity for shaping regional practice with regard to the law of treaties and the regulatory framework of the IADC.

[via Opinio Juris]

http://www.dipublico.org/106118/the-venezuela-crisis-at-the-organization-of-american-states-between-withdrawal-and-suspension/